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Chapter 3 
Workfare in Manitoba 
By Shauna MacKinnon 
Manitoba's welfare poor have been put through the wringer throughout the 1990s. 
Government policies have done nothing to alleviate poverty. Instead, government 
has increasingly blamed the poor. A review of social policy measures throughout 
the past decade reveals two major concerns. 
• There has been an ideologically motivated, deliberate and systematic with-
drawal of support for individuals and families on social assistance. 
• The government has ff dealt" with Manitoba's shameful poverty statistics 
by creating a perception that the blame for poverty falls on those who are 
poor. The government's message has been that people on welfare need 
fixing. 
The attack on Manitoba's poor began in earnest in the early 1990s. A series of 
social service cutbacks resulted in great hardship for many. Provincial measures 
combined with the abolition by the federal government of the Canada Assistance 
Plan and its national standards were part of a significant shift in how government 
intervenes in the lives of the poor. 
Setting the Stage for Workfare 
The most regressive amendments to the Social Allowances Act began in 1993. These 
policy changes-which the National Council of Welfare called an ff attack on Mani-
toba's poor"-were a precursor to the introduction of workfare (NCW, 1997, p. 
72). 
The following list highlights the changes to social policy in Manitoba since 
1993. 
1993 
In order to standardize provincial I municipal welfare rates, the province of Mani-
toba amended the Social Allowances Act with the following detrimental changes. 
• Exemptions dropped from $240 a month to $130 for families and from $125 to 
$95 a month for single people. (Exemptions refers to the amount of money 
social assistance recipients are able to earn in addition to their assistance. Money 
earned beyond the exemption amount is deducted in full from the recipient's 
social assistance payment.) 
• Families lost the $205 monthly exemption on any child support payments 
they were receiving during their first three months on welfare. 
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• Income tax refunds aside from tax credits were no longer exempt income. 
• Provincial income supplements of up to $30 a month per child in low income 
families and a provincial supplement of more than $100 every three months 
for people fifty-five and older were also dropped from the list of exempt in-
come. 
Supplemental health insurance coverage for welfare recipients was cut back. 
Covered medication and services were trimmed, major restorative dental services 
were subject to new dollar limits and new welfare recipients had a three-month 
waiting period imposed on them for non-emergency dental and vision care. 
Special welfare programs for students ended, resulting in the return of over a 
thousand people to the municipal welfare rolls. 
1994 
Shelter allowances were cut by $14 a month for employable single people. 
The $30 supplement received monthly by single people and childless couples 
was cut. 
The income definition used to determine tax credits was broadened to in-
clude incomes previously exempt, including social assistance. In effect, tax credits 
for welfare recipients were reduced and therefore the supplement paid directly to 
social assistance recipients through Family Services was reduced. 
Grants to welfare organizations, day care facilities and nurseries were cut. 
Special needs policies which included newborn allowances, assistance to pur-
chase appliances, moving expenses, school supplies, household start-up needs, 
bedding, beds and other extraordinary expenses were eliminated. 
There were further cuts to the range of prescription medication covered by 
social assistance. 
The province spent $50,000 advertising its welfare fraud line. 
1995 
Single mothers became the suggested target of future cuts and administrative con-
trols with the inception of welfare reform programs such as Taking Charge!, Mani-
toba's largest welfare reform program. 
The province passed legislation to enforce child support from non-custodial 
parents-one of the few potentially positive social policy initiatives during this 
period. 
1996 
On June 4, 1996, the then Minister of Family Services, Bonnie Mitchelson, intro-
duced Bill 36, The Social Allowances Amendment and Consequential Amendments 
Act. The intent of the Bill was to amend the Social Allowances Act in three ways: 
to provide for a one-tier system in the City of Winnipeg which would transfer 
responsibility for City of Winnipeg welfare recipients to the provincial system; to 
provide direction for welfare reform; and to update the Act with regard to the 
elimination of the Canada Assistance Plan. 
The name of the Act was amended to accommodate the fundamental change 
as defined by welfare reform. With the passing of Bill 36, the Social Allowances 
Act was changed to the Employment and Income Assistance Act. The words "So-
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cial Allowances" were purposely eliminated and replaced to reflect an emphasis 
on "work." 
The national standards that were firmly entrenched within the Canada As-
sistance Plan died with the Act. The impact of this for Manitoba was realized with 
the passing of Bill 36. Section 5.4 of the Employment and Income Assistance Act 
gives the provincial government the power to implement work for welfare poli-
cies. With regard to obligations regarding employment, Section 5.4(1) states that 
"an applicant, recipient or dependent as specified in the regulations has an obliga-
tion to satisfy the director or the municipality, as the case may be, that he or she (a) 
has met the employment obligations set out in the regulations that he or she is 
required to meet and (b) has undertaken any employability enhancement meas-
ure as set out in the regulations that he or she is required to undertake." "Where 
employment obligations are not met" section 5.4(2) allows the director" ... '.J to den,y 
reduce, suspend or discontinue the income assistance, municipal assistance or 
general assistance otherwise payable, in accordance with the regulations." Indi-
viduals could now be refused assistance if they failed to "meet the employment 
obligations to the satisfaction of the director or municipality." Years of post-war 
struggle to ensure the right to financial assistance for all citizens was gone. 
Other changes in 1996 included the following. 
1999 
• Rates were reduced from $458 to $411 per month for single employable 
people and from $77 4 to $692 for childless couples. 
• Benefits were cut from people who did not meet "reasonable" training or 
employment expectations. All new applicants were now required to sign 
personalized training and employability plans. 
• Family heads could lose up to $100 a month if they did not meet work 
expectations. 
• The 1996 budget cut 3.2 percent of government spending, including $23 
million in welfare spending.1 
• The exemption of provincial tax credits paid to about 18,500 people on 
welfare in Winnipeg was reduced. 
• The City of Winnipeg reduced its enhanced social assistance rates for 
children in 1996. They eliminated Christmas allowances for municipal 
welfare recipients and instead donated $135,000 to the Christmas Cheer 
Board. 
• Municipal rates for children were reduced to provincial rates in 1997. 
An attempt to broaden the coercive nature of Bill 36 was introduced through Bill 
40 in July 1999. This Bill expanded on Section 5.4 to allow the government to deny 
financial assistance to individuals who refused to participate in addiction treat-
ment when ordered to do so. Recipients would also be obligated to attend parenting 
programs and training. The community would be given an increased role in the 
policing of welfare recipients as those individuals not in other programs would be 
expected to "volunteer" thirty-five hours per week in exchange for their benefits. 
Shortly after being elected in September 1999, the NDP government announced 
that Bill 40 would not be implemented. The new government indicated a desire to 
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implement policies that support and encourage rather than punish and browbeat 
the poor. Although this appears to be a step in the right direction, it was the con-
tents of Bill 36 that opened the door to workfare and those fundamental changes 
are now legislation. The power to implement work for welfare policies is entrenched 
within the Employment and Income Assistance Act. As a result workfare remains 
a concern in Manitoba. 
Origins of Workfare 
The premise of workfare is that government-delivered income support is condi-
tional upon the recipient participating in activities as prescribed by the govern-
ment. The official rationale for this model is the claim that it will lead participants 
quickly back to employment. 
The concept of work for welfare dates back to the Elizabethan poor laws of 
1601. Providing work for the able-bodied unemployed was a central concern and 
obligation of the parish under Elizabethan poor laws. The able-bodied poor were 
sent to workhouses as it was felt that they would learn good work habits and earn 
their keep (Guest, 1997, p. 12). 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the workhouse concept lost its popular-
ity; "outdoor relief" became the chosen method of providing for the poor. This 
meant that any assistance available to the poor was provided on an emergency 
basis through municipalities and private charities. The principles of the poor laws 
remained. 
This mechanism remained popular until the First World War, during which 
time attitudes toward the poor changed very little, in Canada as elsewhere. The 
poor were viewed as lazy, immoral, or incompetent-all of which was used as 
justification for limiting income assistance to very low levels. For example, the 
concept of "less eligibility" -the idea that assistance must be less than that which 
the lowest-paid labourer could earn-was a central tenet. The beginnings of a new 
approach were faintly visible after the war, with the inauguration of the "mothers' 
allowance" in British Columbia and Ontario and occasional statements from policy-
makers and politicians that widowed and deserted mothers deserved a "pension" 
from the state for the socially necessary work of raising the next generation of 
citizens. 
The Great Depression of the 1930s led to the idea that unemployment was 
beyond individual control; the notion that unemployed people were lazy was chal-
lenged. Unemployment was so widespread that it was no longer possible to blame 
the impoverished for their fate. 
The Second World War brought an end to the catastrophic conditions of the 
Depression. Production and employment grew. So did demand for a public social 
safety net to avoid a return to Depression conditions. 
The welfare state began to take shape with the passing of the Unemployment 
Insurance Act in 1940. The expansion of public assistance in Britain prompted the 
Canadian government to follow suit. The Report on Social Security for Canada (a 
report by Leonard Marsh in 1943, known as the Marsh Report) provided the basis 
for the development of a publicly administered welfare system, fashioned at least 
in part after the British model, that evolved through to the 1970s. Although the 
system was less than perfect and retained traces of the residual model of the poor 
laws, citizens' rights to assistance were more firmly entrenched through the na-
tional standards embodied in the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP), enacted in 1966. 
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The power of the welfare state peaked in the 1970s and then began to decline. 
By the 1990s the national standards of CAP had been completely abolished with 
the implementation of the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST). This new 
mechanism for the delivery of social services became policy in 1996. The National 
Council of Welfare has called the Canada Health and Social Transfer "the worst 
social policy initiative undertaken by the federal government in more than a gen-
eration" (National Council of Welfare, 1995). It is this fundamental change, in par-
ticular the loss of national standards, that has allowed workfare to re-emerge as 
the contemporary successor to the workhouse of the poor law era. 
The Current Socio-political Environment 
Increasingly, the right not to have to work in order to be entitled to receive welfare 
benefits is a thing of the past. But it is not just government policies that have 
changed. Perhaps more disturbing is the apparent change in public sentiment that 
has resulted in growing support for policies which penalize, demean and point a 
finger at the poor. How did we, as a society, move from public support for a fun-
damental right to government assistance for those in need to public contempt for 
the poor? 
Discussion of welfare reform twenty years ago focussed on making the wel-
fare state increasingly progressive. The idea of a guaranteed annual income was 
even floated on occasion-although it never came close to implementation, and as 
advanced by the Macdonald Royal Commission was a recipe for guaranteed an-
nual poverty. Ideas of making the welfare state more progressive are now miles 
away. Stereotypes of the poor as lazy, undeserving and in need of punishment 
have been nurtured by governments to justify a return to pre-Second World War 
welfare measures. Even those individuals who contribute to society by caring for 
their children have been unable to escape the wrath of punitive policy-makers. 
The former Government of Manitoba was at the forefront of the attack on the 
poor by systematically chipping away at welfare programs and suggesting that 
welfare recipients are lazy and dishonest. They implemented a welfare fraud line, 
implying, irresponsibly, that welfare cheats are running rampant. The welfare fraud 
line was not based on good empirical evidence at the time of its inception, and 
since then has failed to demonstrate any pervasive abuse of the welfare system. 
Instead, it contributed to a false perception of welfare fraud that allowed govern-
ment to implement a series of regressive policy measures. 
In fact, research indicates that "welfare fraud represents 2 to 3 percent of a 
total annual welfare bill of $15 billion. By way of comparison, an Ekos Research 
study in the summer of 1995 reported that two out of five people surveyed admit-
ted that they cheated on their income taxes, and three out of four said they would 
cheat if they knew they would not get caught" (NCW, 1997, p. 117). Nonetheless, a 
lack of understanding of the issues has led to some public support for the draco-
nian policy measures that have emerged. 
The Manitoba Welfare Reform Model 
Manitoba's Employment and Income Assistance Program was implemented in 
May of 1996. It was described by the former Government of Manitoba as the "Pro-
gram of last resort for people who need help to meet basic personal and family 
needs" (Gorlick and Brethour, 1998). It is aimed at "helping people find a job or 
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get back to work." Recipients must "maintain an active job search." Also known 
as "Welfare Reform," the Government's model consists of a variety of workfare I 
learnfare (mandatory job training) initiatives administered through the Depart-
ment of Family Services and the Department of Education and Training. The stated 
goal is to provide training to "help people prepare for job searches and subse-
quent employment." Employment-based programs and services are also deliv-
ered through Community Partnerships and Employment Connections under the 
umbrella of Employment First. Participation in Employment First is mandatory 
for all income assistance recipients. Those who do not comply are punished with 
budget reductions. Single parents with a child under six years or a dependent 
child requiring extensive care, people with disabilities, the elderly and people in 
authorized crisis facilities are exempt. 
The former Government of Manitoba maintained that the program would not 
displace workers or volunteers in the local economy. All Employment and Income 
Assistance applicants are expected to attend orientation programs where avail-
able. They must complete an employment plan and are to report their progress to 
a worker on a regular basis. 
A 1998 national inventory of welfare-to-work programs reports that senior 
government officials have indicated that a more comprehensive evaluation would 
be forthcoming-one which measures cost effectiveness, evaluates outcome data 
collected on participants, and measures participant satisfaction (Gorlick and 
Brethour, 1998). There is no indication that such an evaluation is forthcoming; 
government officials contacted are unaware of it. However they did indicate that 
there has been an evaluation of Taking Charge! The results of this evaluation have 
not yet been released to the public. 
Is Workfare Working? 
The passing of Bill 36 in 1996 enabled the province to implement involuntary pro-
grams that focus on pushing people off the welfare rolls. The previous govern-
ment pointed to welfare statistics to defend the program's success. As indicated in 
Table One, total expenditures for social assistance were reduced by 9 percent from 
1995 to 1998. 
Since 1997, the provincial government has clawed back the National Child 
Benefit (NCB) supplement from welfare recipients. The NCB is a federal supple-
ment provided to low-income families aimed at reducing child poverty. The prov-
inces were given the option of clawing back this supplement from welfare recipi-
ents and "reinvesting" the funds in programming. This is the route the former 
Government of Manitoba chose to take. Like other low-income families, those on 
social assistance receive their NCB supplement directly from the federal govern-
ment. The Province then reduces their social assistance payment by an equivalent 
amount. This reduction is reflected as reduced provincial expenditures on social 
assistance. What is significant is that this "savings" in provincial social assistance 
expenditures comes at the expense of the poorest children in Manitoba. While 
Table One shows a reduction of Family Services expenditures, it is in part due to a 
reduction in financial assistance to families who continue to be on the social assist-
ance rolls. 
The number of welfare cases involving employable recipients has declined 
since the inception of Manitoba welfare reform (Table Two). However, there is no 
empirical evidence to suggest that this reduction is due to welfare reform. Further, 
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Table 1: Provincial Government Expenditures on Welfare Programs 
Family Service Family Service Education and Training Expenditures on Total expenditures 
Year Expenditures for allocation to Employment and Development Programs on Welfare Employment and Making Welfare for support for E&IA clients, including programs* Income Assistance * Work Making Welfare Work* 
1995-96 374,838 0 7,201.50 382,039.50 
1996-97 357,165 3,352. 10 7,620.00 368,138.00 
1997-98 336,986. ** 4,983.00 7,918.40 349,887.4** 
* in millions 
* * $1 0 million in recovery on National Chi ld Benefit has been deducted from this amount. The government of 
Manitoba has chosen to deduct this federal supplement paid to low income families from welfare benefits. 
Source: Government of Manitoba Annual Reports 
there is absolutely no evidence that welfare reform has had any positive impact on 
poverty rates in Manitoba. The number of Manitobans living in poverty contin-
ued to rise in the 1990s (Lezubski, Silver and Black, Chapter Two). 
Although Table One shows some decline in welfare expenditures, there has 
been an increase in food-bank use for individuals who are not on assistance. The 
number of individuals served by food banks has dropped marginally since 1995, 
but the number of working households assisted has almost doubled in the same 
period----evidence of the former provincial government's low-wage strategy (Black 
and Shaw, Chapter Four). The increase in food-bank use by households not on 
social assistance, along with the increase in the number of people living in pov-
erty, suggests that welfare reform has not contributed to the overall well-being of 
the poor (Table Three). The decline in the number of welfare caseloads is attribut-
able to a variety of factors that will be discussed further. 
For those who have found work, workfare creates a revolving-door phenom-
enon with no permanent gains in full-time employment. The majority of jobs 
accessed through welfare reform are unskilled jobs, and few become permanent. 
"A cost conscious employer who can train people in a few days has no incentive to 
keep them on the payroll when demand is slackD ... D." (Jenks, 1997, p. 3). Those 
who do manage to find full-time employment are most often struggling to make 
ends meet on minimum or near-minimum wages, as unskilled workers have a 
Table 2: Average Monthly Social 
Assistance Caseload by Category 
Category 1995/96 1996/97 
Ch ildren 183 
Single Parents 12,384 
Aged 398 
Disabled 11,536 
Crisis Facili ty Cases 101 
Genera l Assistance 1,556 
Special Cases 24 
Total 26,182 
Source: Family SeNices Annual Reports 
**excludes Mun icioa l cases 
163 
12,013 
372 
11 ,748 
111 
1,295 
28 
25,730 
1997/98 
133 
11,256 
35 1 
12, 115 
98 
1, 114 
36 
25,103 
Workfare in Manitoba 59 
Table 3: Welfare Statistics vs Food Bank Use 
Welfare Cases (for Winnipeg Harvest households served 
Year March of each year) (for March of each year) 
Households on Harvest households Total individuals Provincial and City Assistance 
served (not on served by Winnipeg Combined (provincial and city 
assistance) Harvest 
combined) 
1995 78,325 11,360 2,640 33,000 
1996 73,715 12,800 3,200 35,000 
1997 68,315 12,576 3,424 35,000 
1998 62,805 12,639 3,861 35,150 
1999 unknown 11,3 12 4,582 32,300 
Source: Winnipeg Harvest 
*Harvest number represent food banks in Winnipeg alone. 
In rural Manitoba. food banks have increased from 15 to over 25 from 1995 - 1999 
much lower chance of moving out of low-paying jobs (Statistics Canada, 1998). 
Nor is there a way of knowing how many hours are being worked by those shown 
as being employed in workfare programs. The Province of Manitoba does not keep 
statistics on the number of hours worked for those they have determined are "em-
ployed," making it impossible to determine how many former social assistance 
recipients are working only part-time. 
Manitoba's largest welfare reform program, Taking Charge!, is a $26.2-mil-
lion, five-year pilot project targeted at single parents on welfare. At the time of its 
inception, the government suggested that four thousand single-parent clients would 
be assisted by March of 1999. This would mean a cost of $65,500 per client with no 
guarantee that individuals would find full-time work and not require further as-
sistance. The 1998I 1999 Taking Charge! Annual Report indicates that the program 
has had 3,784 registrants. There are currently 3,098 individuals participating in 
projects and 1453 clients are employed. Whether those 1453 are employed full-
time and are self-sufficient is not stated in the Report. 
Cutting Where it Hurts 
Many initiatives that have in the past had great success in providing training and 
education for welfare recipients who voluntarily chose to participate, have been 
cut by the government throughout the 1990s. For example: 
• Student social allowances were eliminated in 1993. This program allowed 
individuals to continue to receive social assistance while pursuing their edu-
cation. 
• University access programs were introduced in the 1980s to provide educa-
tional opportunities and support for students who would be at high risk of 
failing in the absence of financial, personal and academic supports. These pro-
grams continue to operate but on a shoestring budget after having been cut 
back throughout the 1990s. 
• New Careers South also provided training opportunities to high risk indi-
viduals. This program was eliminated entirely. 
Other programs including preventive parenting and training programs, 
childcare, anti-poverty initiatives, support for people with disabilities, foster par-
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ents, women's shelters, friendship centres and other initiatives that are especially 
important in the lives of the poorest Manitobans lost substantial funding, or in 
some cases were wiped out entirely, as a result of cutbacks. Superficially similar 
programs have been implemented under the banner of welfare reform. The fun-
damental difference, however, is the shift in philosophy that has made participa-
tion mandatory. 
What are the Problems with Workfare? 
Opposition to workfare is based on a variety of concerns. The coercive, controlling 
nature of the program and the absence of choice is paternalistic, humiliating and 
stigmatizing to an already targeted population. Merely making the program man-
datory feeds into the notion that people are unemployed by their own choice. 
Workfare does not attempt to address poverty. In fact, it takes the focus away 
from the issue of poverty by creating the illusion that low-income individuals them-
selves are responsible for their difficult economic circumstances. As shown in 
Chapter Two of this volume, poverty in Winnipeg has continued to grow since the 
inception of welfare reform. 
Workfare creates a source of low-wage and free labour by providing subsidies 
to the private sector and forcing recipients to volunteer in exchange for assistance. 
Workfare employees do not qualify for the same benefits and protections that other 
employees enjoy. Free labour is disguised as volunteer labour to avoid contraven-
ing labour legislation. The move toward coercing welfare recipients who are not 
working or training, to "volunteer" their time to community organizations is a 
concern. This provides free labour to the same community organizations which 
have suffered as a result of government cutbacks. 
There is a very dark irony operating in this latest policy development. The 
former provincial government cut support to agencies which provide support to 
the poorest in society. That same government then implemented policy which forces 
the poor to work for free for those agencies that are no longer able to provide them 
with support. 
Under workfare, poverty advocates become policy enforcers, ensuring that 
recipients are reporting for duty. This creates a serious ethical dilemma for service 
providers. In Ontario, where workfare is more advanced, many churches and com-
munity groups have refused to take on this policing and supervisory role. 2 
In Manitoba, employers are paid up to $3 per hour toward the wages of a 
"Work First" participant with no obligations beyond the contractual period. Be-
cause subsidized employers need not commit to workers, it is doubtful that this 
form of intervention results in long-term employment. Many employers fail to 
hire workers permanently once the subsidized period ends. Most who do keep 
workfare workers on had a position that needed to be filled with or without 
workfare. The end result is simply the displacement of a non-workfare worker. A 
job is not created and the primary beneficiary of the subsidy program is the em-
ployer. Economist Robert Solow describes the concept in terms of a game of musi-
cal chairs . 
. . . D the labor market is like a game, or several games, of musical chairs. 
When the music stops, the players scramble for the available chairs. Since 
there are fewer chairs than players, the losers are left standing. They are, 
you might say, the unemployed. If the game were repeated, the losers 
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might be different people, but the number of losers is determined entirely 
by the number of players and the number of chairs. Adding more play-
ers, which is what forcing welfare beneficiaries into the labor market would 
do, can only increase unemployment. Some former welfare recipients will 
find jobs. Perhaps many will, because among other reasons, they are hun-
gry, but only by displacing formerly employed members of the assidu-
ously working poor (Solow, 1998, p. 3). 
As competition is added at the level of the least skilled workers, "the costs of 
adjusting to the influx of former welfare recipients spreads to the working poor, 
the working just-less-poor, and so on, in the form of lower wages and heightened 
job insecurity" (Solow, 1998, p. 5). 
The mandatory nature of workfare results in individuals being attached to 
workplaces and training experiences that are often outside of their interests and 
aptitude. This can be frustrating for employer I trainers and for participants. The 
stigmatization that accompanies welfare recipients often results in employers not 
feeling that recipients are worth hiring without the subsidy. They are often not 
kept on or their hours are reduced to a point where they are forced to leave. Stud-
ies of employers' hiring habits have confirmed this. While employers are willing 
to hire welfare recipients with a subsidy attached, they tend not to continue to 
employ them. Non-welfare recipients are often chosen over workfare workers for 
positions that are permanent (Harrison, Bennett, et al, 1998). 
Social services workers can cite endless examples of single parents receiving a 
reduction in hours at their work placements once the subsidized period has ended.3 
Unable to survive on casual hours, they often quit. Unable to collect Employment 
Insurance or find full-time work, they return to Employment and Income Assist-
ance for help. Unfortunately they find that returning for assistance is not a simple 
process. Employment and Income Assistance workers question the decision to 
leave paid employment, regardless of how inadequate it may have been, to seek 
government assistance. Government officials have stated that even marginal at-
tachment to the workforce is considered a success of welfare reform. Those who 
choose to leave are subjected to a lengthy investigation before assistance is pro-
vided. Of course, the numbers of individuals waiting in limbo while being inves-
tigated are not reflected in welfare statistics. There have been reports of people 
who have waited months before they could get welfare to accept them back on the 
rolls. 
The policy of providing employers with subsidies has further implications. 
Displacement of non-subsidized workers is clearly a problem. Skill development 
is not a focus of job placements. Without development of skills, workfare partici-
pants will remain vulnerable in the market place with little hope of moving on to 
better jobs. 
There have also been concerns expressed about who is actually getting the 
jobs. One individual interviewed (who wished to remain anonymous) has been 
actively involved in welfare reform since 1995 and expressed the opinion that there 
is an ongoing concern with racism. Of all welfare reform participants, it appears 
that Aboriginal people have had the most difficulty finding work placements. This 
observation is consistent with U.S. data which show minority groups being least 
likely to benefit (Holzer, 1997, p. 1). 
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Table 4: Social Assistance 
Related Training Support Programs 
1997/1 998 New Careers Community Partnerships Fiscal Year North 
Pa rticipants 1387 148 517 
Employed 41 102 164 
% empl oyed 2.9% 68.0% 31.7% 
drop out rate Not known Not known Not known 
off assistance Not known Not known Not known 
Source: Manitoba Education And Training Annual Report 
N/ A Information not available 
Total Contribution by Education and Traininq = $3,986.8 million 
Labour Market Employment Youth Now Training Connections 
310 937 669 
109 370 330 
35.1% 39.4% 49.3% 
Not known Not known Not known 
Not known Not known Not known 
98/99 Annual 
Report 
Participants 
Oct 95-Mar 99 
Employed 
% employed 
Drop out rate 
off assistance 
Taking Charge 
1,143 
434 
3.7% 
Not known 
Not known 
TAKING 
CHARGE! 
3,784 
1,453 
38 
N/A 
N/A 
There are also concerns for those individuals who take the "training" route of 
welfare reform. Training available to people on welfare is limited to short-term 
programs that most often result in low-wage employment, if any employment at 
all. Testimonials such as the following are common. 
My worker showed me a variety of courses that I could choose from. I 
told her I wanted to go to university but as a single parent I didn't think I 
could afford the high cost, even with a student loan. I would also need to 
get upgrading first. The worker said that university wasn't one of my 
choices. She encouraged me to take a secretarial course. I did. I hated it. I 
didn't want to be a secretary, I wanted to go to university. I finished but I 
couldn't find work. There are a lot of us being trained in this field and not 
enough jobs for us all. I finally got fed up. I am off assistance now and in 
university. I am accumulating a lot of debt and I don't know if I will ever 
be able to pay it all back. I had to move back in with my dad because I 
couldn't make ends meet. Yeah, I am off of assistance but not because of 
their help. I am far from self sufficient and I am definitely still poor.4 
One common problem with workfare policy at a time of high unemployment 
is that it results in recipients moving in and out of the few jobs available. This 
creates a revolving door through the system. Workfare does not create a long-term 
solution to poverty and unemployment. Although unemployment in Manitoba is 
relatively low, the majority of jobs created in the 1990s have been low-skill, low-
wage jobs that feed the welfare cycle. 
Workfare also violates the U.N. Charter on Social and Cultural rights, which 
stipulates that workers must be free to choose their work (United Nations Com-
mittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1998, p. 8). 
Although information regarding the costs and outcomes of employment and 
training programs for welfare recipients is difficult to find, Table Four provides a 
snapshot of programs including the total number of participants and those em-
ployed at the end of March, 1998. The Province of Manitoba defines success as any 
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earnings from employment. This suggests that "employment" in Table Four is 
similarly defined. 
Whether or not individuals continue to be supported by income assistance is 
not clear. The number of individuals who have dropped out of the programs in 
Table Four is also not known. The difficulty in obtaining this and related informa-
tion is of concern. Several requests for information were made to officials in both 
Family Services and Education and Training. In some cases information was de-
nied or said to be unavailable. The complicated nature of the administrative struc-
ture that involves two major departments has also created barriers for researchers. 
An additional piece of information that was unavailable is the amount of welfare 
reform dollars that goes directly into the pockets of employers in the form of sub-
sidies. One researcher was told that this information would be next to impossible 
to access while another was told that it was all in the Annual Report-although it 
was not.5 
The Experience in North America 
The Manitoba workfare model is not new. It is based on an approach that has been 
used in other provinces and countries. Evaluations of programs allow us to con-
clude that the only accomplishment of workfare is that it shuffles people around 
while keeping them at the bottom. The evidence suggests that the availability of 
jobs is the single most important factor in determining the number of families on 
welfare (National Council of Welfare, 1997). The implementation of workfare has 
had no measurable impact on caseloads. It is the relationship between unemploy-
ment rates and caseloads that was found to be direct and consistent over time 
(University of Wisconsin, 1997, Evaluation of WEJT and CWEP Programs, p. 2). 
Workfare programs have been in existence in other Canadian provinces since 
the mid-1990s. Most Canadian programs are modeled after those in the U.S., which 
have been around since the late 1980s. 
Evaluations of workfare programs in the U.S. highlight a number of concerns. 
Measuring effectiveness by simply looking at reductions in caseloads is a seri-
ously flawed method of evaluation. Reductions can be attributed to many factors 
other than workfare. Participants who successfully find work are often those who 
have higher skills and education and would likely have found work on their own. 
With private sector involvement in workfare and financial reimbursement based 
on successful job placement or attendance, there is a tendency to screen out all but 
the most motivated, well-educated applicants (Hardina, 1997, p. 137). 
A comprehensive cost-effectiveness study of mandatory work and job train-
ing programs in the U.S. looked at program effectiveness and cost efficiency in 
eight U.S. states. The study found that "differences between experimental and 
control groups in terms of both increased earnings and welfare savings were not 
statistically significant" (Hardina, 1997). The study also found little difference be-
tween experimental and control groups in terms of job loss and return to govern-
ment assistance. Burtless (1995) concluded that these programs could not be judged 
effective. Programs did not result in "substantial improvement in most recipients' 
standard of living," and further, "there is no empirical evidence job training, job 
search, or workfare programs are actually effective in putting people in jobs that 
will help them leave the welfare system" (Hardina, 1997, p. 144). The evidence is 
that most people on welfare already do work. They care for their families, work 
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part-time or when work is available, and volunteer in their communities. They do 
this of their own free will. They do not have to be forced to do so. 
The cost of coercion does not come cheap. Many U.S. jurisdictions have aban-
doned their Workfare programs because they have found the administrative cost 
to be too high. Florida spent $1 for every 16 cents saved. Georgia spent $1 for 
every 20 cents saved (O'Keefe, 1995, p. 17). 
As in the U.S., Workfare in Canada is expensive and fraught with problems. 
New Brunswick's much hailed NB Works will cost $59,000 per person if partici-
pants complete the program. Manitoba's Taking Charge! program costs $65,500 
per person. NB Works had a 60 percent dropout rate. No jobs were created through 
NB Works, except for the jobs of those hired to deliver, manage and evaluate the 
program (Mullaly, 1997, p. 57). There has been no change in poverty rates or un-
employment levels in New Brunswick. 
In Ontario, qualitative research has found that welfare recipients who found 
permanent work said they did so on their own. They did not cite Ontario Works as 
helping them in getting off welfare (Report of the Project Team for Monitoring 
Ontario Works, 1999, p. 29). The Quebec scheme was killed after seven years due 
to high costs and failure to improve the long-term employment of recipients. 
Evaluation of programs in other jurisdictions provide the following lessons 
that Manitoba could learn from. 
1. Good evaluation of programming allows us to understand what works, and 
what does not. 
2. Outcomes are modest but better in jurisdictions where jobs are available. High 
unemployment equals low success rates. 
3. People leave welfare naturally. There is little difference found between par-
ticipants and non-participants in control group studies. 
4. Programs which emphasize long-term skill development and education have 
a more sustained impact on earnings, access to good jobs and long term em-
ployment (Workfare Watch, 1997, p. 18). 
Evaluating Programs 
There has been a variety of methods used to evaluate workfare programs. It is 
essential to understand the methods used in order to understand why supporters 
of workfare claim success, while critics maintain that workfare is a failure. 
The most common method of evaluation is to look at the number of welfare 
cases and to attribute the reduction to the success of welfare reform. This has been 
the primary method used by the Province of Manitoba. It is extremely problem-
atic. 
Without a longitudinal study that follows individuals who have left the wel-
fare system, there is no way of knowing if they remain off the system and are 
meeting government objectives of self-sustenance. Only through a longitudinal study 
would we fully understand the implications of workfare in terms of getting and 
keeping people off the system, and more importantly, whether or not they have been 
elevated out of poverty. 
Comprehensive evaluation must include a control group. This is necessary in 
order to establish employment patterns of non-participants to determine if work 
attachment is attributable to workfare policies. Many recipients will enter the 
workforce as appropriate jobs become available. They may also return to assist-
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ance at some point. The rise and decline of welfare caseloads is first and foremost 
a function of the ups and downs of the economy. 
There is no evidence that subsidized employers have contributed to the long-
term employment of participants. There is no expectation that employers con-
tinue to employ recipients once the subsidy expires. There are sufficient data indi-
cating that employers participate only to take advantage of the cheap labour pool 
made available through these programs (Shragge, 1997, p. 73). 
There is no empirical evidence that workfare programs are effective in putting 
people in jobs that will help them leave the welfare system permanently (Hardina, 
1997). Most programs train for low-wage positions. Training provided through 
the public purse is often in areas that were previously the responsibility of em-
ployers. This suggests that the government has taken on the unnecessary expense 
of training welfare recipients for jobs that previously required no training. It is 
employers who are the primary beneficiaries of this policy. 
Looking at numbers alone does not measure the well-being of participants. 
Do welfare recipients past and present feel they are better off, financially and emo-
tionally, as a result of their experience with workfare? Social indicators are re-
quired to measure the social impact of workfare. In Manitoba, as in other jurisdic-
tions, there has been no empirical evidence to suggest that welfare reform has 
been successful. Changes in wages, employment, housing, domestic violence, child 
maltreatment and foster care placement are among the many indicators that would 
need to be considered in a proper evaluation. There is a growing acknowledgment 
that "the development of social indicators is crucial to furthering awareness among 
Canadians about the impact of political and economic activities" (CCSD, 1998, p. 
1). 
There is evidence suggesting that mandatory programs are unnecessary and 
inefficient. A voluntary employment program in Ontario during the early 1990s 
had significant success at a much lower cost (Reid, 1997). Voluntary programs will 
attract people who are interested and motivated. The abundance of such indi-
viduals would suggest that there is no need for mandatory programs and that 
they are not a good use of valuable resources. 
Manitoba's Employment and Income Assistance Act specifies self-sufficiency 
as a goal of welfare reform. The decision to consider even marginal attachment to 
the workforce as success is a far cry from that goal. Marginal attachment to the 
workforce does not move people permanently off welfare and out of poverty and 
such a measure cannot be deemed a success by any stretch of the imagination. A 
single parent with one child needs to work over 80 hours per week at the mini-
mum wage to live above the poverty line. 
For all of these reasons, we must conclude that in Manitoba, as in other juris-
dictions, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that workfare has been or will 
be successful. 
Poverty, Unemployment and Community Values: the Connection 
Workfare is based on the assumption that people on welfare are lazy and dishon-
est. Proponents of workfare assume that people on welfare do not value work; 
that they do not already work. But the evidence suggests that there is no differ-
ence between welfare recipients and non-welfare recipients in terms of their atti-
tudes toward work (Hardina, 1997, p. 133). This suggests that the decision to im-
plement workfare policies is not about helping people live better lives. It is about 
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decreasing public expenditures on income assistance. It is about providing a source 
of low-wage labour and distracting the public from the fundamental issues that 
contribute to welfare dependency in the first place, such as high unemployment, 
lack of financial incentives, inadequate social supports such as childcare and edu-
cational support, and maintaining a low-wage market place which is in part sus-
tained by low-income assistance and involuntary labour. 
Recommendations 
Before attempting to solve the "welfare problem," policy-makers need to take an 
honest look at what the problem is. The problem isn't the people on welfare. The 
problem is high unemployment / underemployment, low wages and inadequate 
redistribution of wealth. This reality needs to be at the forefront of any discussion 
that attempts to propose welfare reform measures. The focus must move beyond a 
simple examination of the welfare rolls to a serious discussion about structural 
solutions. There is no dispute that the existence of large numbers of people on the 
welfare rolls is a serious matter that requires resolution. Consensus does not ex-
tend to how governments can best intervene. It is at this point that ideological 
differences shine through. 
Critics of workfare suggest that progressive, effective welfare reform requires 
a comprehensive approach to social policy. Progressive solutions would take into 
account the following: 
• The first priority needs to be the creation of jobs that pay a living wage. 
Welfare recipients, like the rest of society, need to be able to be free to 
choose jobs they feel are appropriate for them. Workfare does not create 
jobs. 
• The Government of Manitoba should drop the policy of penalizing poor 
families on welfare by clawing back part of the National Child Benefit 
from welfare cheques. 
• The Government of Manitoba should concentrate program efforts on sup-
portive programming that allows people to explore their interests and 
pursue education and training as appropriate. This does not mean that 
there cannot be help along the way. That help however should be sup-
portive and encouraging, not coercive and controlling. 
• The Government of Manitoba should increase spending in the area of 
childcare. The lack of affordable registered childcare spaces continues to 
be a problem which keeps people out of the workforce. 
• Welfare rates should be increased sufficiently to enable those on social as-
sistance to meet the basic necessities of life. 
• The Government of Manitoba should lobby the federal government to re-
instate a national program for income security with clear national stand-
ards and adequate cash transfers to the provinces. 
• The government should stop contributing to the negative public percep-
tion of welfare recipients. The efforts of the government to paint a picture 
of welfare recipients as lazy and dishonest has been extremely damaging 
to these families. Contrary to popular belief, it is not the lack of attach-
ment to the workforce that destroys self esteem, as much as it is the day-
to-day experience of being told that by virtue of your economic status, 
you are less of a citizen than your neighbour. As stated by one representa-
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tive in the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights report (1998) in reference to welfare policy in Canada: 
It is "unbecoming" a democratic society. It is one thing to beat the budget 
deficit, but not at the expense of bringing about a very harmful, a very 
inhumane social and economic revolution that is taking place now. 
The U.N. Report (1998), strongly urged Canadian governments to abandon 
workfare programmes. The committee reminded Canada that: "provincial workfare 
programs violate the international covenant on economic, social and cultural 
rights." 
The government needs to broaden the search for solutions and look at less 
punitive models that have had success. An excellent example is a four-year com-
munity-based program in Ontario. "Going to Work: Waterloo Region Opportuni-
ties Planning (OP)" used a participatory approach to include community agencies 
and social assistance recipients in the design of a program to address unemploy-
ment and poverty (Reid, 1997). Opportunities Planning was a voluntary program 
that allowed clients to identify their personal barriers and assist them in overcom-
ing those barriers. By the end of three years, 1100 people had found permanent 
jobs or created their own work through self-employment. After one year, 85 per-
cent remained employed. The target population of OP were those least likely to 
succeed in finding work on their own. The community-based approach ensured 
that the program was staffed by individuals who themselves had been on social 
assistance. Cost analyses found that the program had produced $2.2 million in 
welfare savings on an investment of $1.3 million in the program's first two years. 
By the end of the program in 1996, "it had generated more than $7.5 million in 
welfare savings and increased economic activity, equivalent to a return of $2.16 
for every government dollar invested in the program" (Reid, 1997). This example 
is evidence of the value of community-based solutions to poverty. 
There has also been some positive work done in Manitoba. Opportunities for 
Employment has had some success with their job placement model. However, 
once again, this may be helpful in finding jobs for a select few. It will not resolve 
the larger problem of poverty and most certainly does not require a mandatory 
approach. What is needed is a comprehensive approach which addresses poverty 
at its roots and which employs community-based solutions. 
Conclusion 
The concern about poverty is not limited to the U.N. and a few anti-poverty activ-
ists. In response to the U.S. Government's assertion that the American welfare 
reform model, which Canada and Manitoba have modeled, has been a success, 
Senator Paul Wellstone (1998) states: 
The welfare rolls may have been cut in half, but not poverty. I don't quite 
understand how the White House, or any Democrat or Republican, can 
proclaim this policy a success when we have done so little to actually 
reduce poverty in our country, especially the shameful poverty of women 
and children. Rather than all this boosterism, let's have an honest policy 
evaluation to find out what is really happening to poor families D ... D. 
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The former Government of Manitoba followed other provinces in the imple-
mentation of welfare policy without regard to the literature that consistently dem-
onstrates the adverse consequences of this direction. Workfare is a huge step back-
ward in social policy. 
It should be stopped. 
Notes 
2 
3 
4 
5 
"For the period 1992 / 93 to 1997 / 98, after adjusting for inflation, the Con-
servative provincial government had cut expenditures by the following 
amounts: education, $111.9 million; health, $121.7 million; social assistance, 
$143.9 million; and total government spending less debt charges, $519.8 mil-
lion. By 1997 the government boasted that 'the Manitoba government is now 
smaller than at any time since the mid-1970s"' (Black and Silver, 1999, p. 13) 
The United Church of Canada council voted to encourage all its mission units 
and pastoral charges to refuse to participate in mandatory work programs for 
social assistance recipients at the 36th general council meeting in Camrose, 
Alberta, 1997. 
Focus groups with Social Assistant clients and anti-poverty advocates (who 
wish to remain anonymous) in preparation of the Alternative Provincial Budget 
revealed that this is a common experience. 
Interview with a University of Manitoba student who wished to remain anony-
mous 
Researchers were connected with a variety of government employees who 
failed to provide information requested. 
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